Thursday, April 15 2021
4:00pm - 5:00pm
Masters Presentation
Analysis of the Asymptotics of the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game

In this project, we find Nash equilibriums for the lowest unique positive integer game (LUPI) and two variations of it. We are focusing on the asymptotics of the game and how it behaves when there are a large number of players, using techniques that can be extracted to other variations. We studied both the standard version of the game and two over variants. One variation is where the player wants to find the lowest integer that was chosen some exact, larger than one, number of times rather than being unique. And the other is where there is a first place that is the same as classic LUPI and a second place that is achieved by choosing the lowest number chosen exactly twice. We solved for the Nash equilibrium of these games using both numerical techniques and using an evolutionary technique similar to machine learning.
Speaker:Alyssa Newman
Location:See Zoom link from email

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